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Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the e¤ects of transitory scal expansions when pub-
lic debt is used as liquidity by the private sector. Aggregate shocks are introduced into
a tractable exible-price, incomplete-market economy where heterogenous, innitely-lived
agents face occasionally binding borrowing constraints and store wealth to smooth out idio-
syncratic income uctuations. Debt-nanced increases in public spending facilitate self-
insurance by bond holders and may crowd in private consumption. The implied higher stock
of liquidity also loosens the borrowing constraints faced by rms, thereby raising labour
demand and possibly the real wage. Whether private consumption and wages actually rise
or fall ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the liquidity and wealth e¤ects that
arise following the shock. The expansionary e¤ects of tax cuts are also discussed.
Keywords: Borrowing constraints; public debt; scal policy shocks.
JEL codes: E21; E62.
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous analysons les e¤ets des politiques budgétaires expansion-
nistes lorsque la dette publique est utilisée comme liquidité par les agents privés. Nous
introduisons des chocs agrégés dans une économie avec marchés incomplets et prix exi-
bles, et dans laquelle des agents hétérogènes et vivant indéniment font face à des con-
traintes dendettement et accumulent de la richesse pour lisser les uctuations de leur revenu
individuel. Une augmentation des dépenses publiques nancée par émission de dette fa-
cilite lauto-assurance des détenteurs dobligation et peut stimuler la consommation privée.
Laccroissement du stock de liquidité relâche également les contraintes dendettement des
entreprises, élevant ainsi leur demande de travail et éventuellement le salaire réel déquilibre.
En dénitive, le¤et total de cette politique sur la consommation privée et le salaire dépend
de la force relative des e¤ets de liquidité et des e¤ets de richesse qui font suite au choc. Nous
étudions également le¤et expansionniste dune baisse dimpôt.
Mots-clés: Contraintes dendettement; dette publique; chocs de politique budgétaire.
Codes JEL: E21; E62.
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Introduction
In this paper, we analyse the e¤ects of transitory scal expansions when public debt is used
as liquidity by the private sector. We conduct this analysis in an incomplete-market model
where agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk and have limited ability to borrow
against future income (i.e., markets are liquidity-constrainedin the terminology of Kehoe
and Levine, 2001, amongst others). Non-Ricardian models of this type have on occasion
been used to analyse the aggregate and welfare e¤ects of public debt in the steady state (see
Woodford, 1990; Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).1 To date, there have been surprisingly few
attempts at clarifying how such economies respond to aggregate scal shocks. One important
contribution is Heathcote (2005), who o¤ers a quantitative assessment of the e¤ect of tax
cuts. In this paper, we attempt to characterise analytically and qualitatively the impact and
dynamic e¤ects of government spending shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
The spending shocks of which we analyse the e¤ects have one signicant, and realistic,
feature: they are at least partly nanced by government bond issues in the short run, with
public debt then gradually reverting to some long-run target value thanks to future tax in-
creases.2 Note that whether government spending is nanced by taxes or debt does not mat-
ter in complete-markets, Ricardian economies with lump-sum taxation, because households
discounted disposable income ows are identical between alternative modes of government
nancing. Then, under reasonable assumptions about preferences and technology, the nega-
tive wealth e¤ects associated with transitory spending shocks lead to falls in the demand for
both private consumption and leisure, which in turn produces a drop in the real wage (e.g.,
Baxter and King, 1993).
The decit nancing of spending shocks can, however, have very di¤erent consequences
1Other important applications of the liquidity-constraint paradigm to macroeconomic issues include
Bewley-type monetary models (e.g., Bewley, 1983; Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986), models of capital ac-
cumulation with precautionary savings (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1997), models of business cycles with
heterogenous agents (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1998) and asset-pricing models with borrowing constraints
and short-sales constraints (e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Krusell and Smith, 1997).
2For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) document a limited impact response of taxes to spending
shocks in the U.S., implying decit nancing in the short run. Bohn (1998) established that the U.S.
debt-GDP ratio is mean-reverting due to the corrective action of the primary surplus.
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when public debt is used as private liquidity, that is, as a store of value held by agents for
precautionary, or self-insurance, purposes. Starting from a situation in which liquidity is
scarce (in a sense that we specify below), such policies have the side e¤ect of increasing
the stock of assets available in the economy, thereby facilitating self-insurance by bond
holders and e¤ectively relaxing the borrowing constraints faced by households and rms. As
we show, the liquidity e¤ects associated with rising public debt tend to foster households
private consumption demand, along with the labour demand of borrowing-constrained rms.
Whether and when such liquidity e¤ects may o¤set wealth e¤ects, and thus overturn the
predictions of the complete-markets model regarding the e¤ects of spending shocks on private
consumption and wages, is the central theme of this paper.
It is perhaps surprising that the actual impact of our scal experiment is still subject
to so much empirical controversy. In particular, the application of di¤erent identication
strategies to U.S. data has either supported the Real Business Cycle prediction of a fall in
private consumption and wages following an increase in public spending (Ramey and Shapiro,
1998; Ramey, 2009), or come to the opposite conclusion that both variables actually increase
after the shock (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2007), which latter is consistent
with the Old Keynesian model and with a version of the New Keynesian model endowed with
a su¢ cient number of market imperfections (Gali et al., 2007). Given this lack of consensus,
our goal here is not to take any denitive position as to whether an adequate scal policy
model should generate pro- or counter-cyclical responses of those variables to public spending
shocks. Rather, we use our model to illustrate that both outcomes are theoretically possible
(and not implausible quantitatively), depending on the relative strengths of the liquidity and
wealth e¤ects that arise following the shock. As we show, which e¤ect actually dominates
crucially depends on how quickly the scal rule followed by the government ensures the
reversion of public debt towards its long-run target following the initial scal decit. If taxes
rise promptly after the increase in public spending, then public debt will not vary very much
and liquidity e¤ects will be weak; in this situation, wealth e¤ects are likely to be dominant
and private consumption and wages will fall. If, on the contrary, the slow reaction of taxes
leads to a substantial growth of public debt in the short and the medium run, then liquidity
e¤ects may be strong enough to dominate wealth e¤ects, causing private consumption and
wages to rise. Overall, temporary increases in public spending are all the more e¤ective at
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raising output when the simultaneous response of taxes is limited.3
The market incompleteness-cum-borrowing constraint assumption is the only departure
from the frictionless neoclassical model considered here, the other aspects of our model
remain fully standard in a stripped-down form. In contrast to several recent contributions
on the e¤ect of public spending shocks, we thus assume that the labour and goods markets
are perfectly competitive, that both nominal prices and wages are fully exible, that utility
is separable over time as well as over consumption and leisure at any point in time, that all
agents are utility-maximising, that there are no externalities associated with public spending,
and that taxes are lump sum.4 Our model thus provides an example of an economy wherein
the pro-cyclical responses of private consumption and wages after a scal expansion arises
from the non-Ricardian nature of the model alone.
Our model belongs to the growing literature on the consequences of market incomplete-
ness and borrowing constraints for scal policy outcomes. Woodford (1990) derived the opti-
mal level of steady-state public debt in a deterministic model in which borrowing-constrained
agents hold government bonds for precautionary purposes. This work was subsequently ex-
tended by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) to incorporate idiosyncratic uncertainty, and then
by Floden (2001) to take into account government transfers. Heathcote (2005) introduced
aggregate uncertainty about taxes into this framework, while our paper focuses the e¤ects
of aggregate uncertainty about public spending (for the rst time, as far as we are aware.)
Methodologically, our paper is closest in spirit to Woodfords in that we derive a tractable
equilibrium with limited agentsheterogeneity (despite the presence of uninsurable income
shocks), which allows us to summarise the behaviour of the model by a small-dimensional
3This latter result is, of course, not inconsistent with the Old Keynesian view about the e¤ectiveness of
scal policy (e.g., the textbook Keynesian crossmodel). It is, however, grounded on a very di¤erent set of
assumptions here.
4Recent scal policy models include Ravn et al. (2006), who assume imperfect competition together with
habit formation over individual varieties of the consumption good, Linnemann (2006), who assumes that
consumption and leisure are nonseparable while consumption is an inferior good, Linnemann and Shabert
(2003), who have imperfect competition and sticky nominal prices, and Gali et al. (2007), who combine ad
hoc hand-to-mouthhouseholds with imperfect competition and price rigidities in both goods and labour
markets. Papers analysing the e¤ects of distortionary taxation in the neoclassical growth model include
Ludvigson (1996) and Burnside et al. (2004), while Baxter and King (1993) consider the e¤ects of government
spending shocks when the latter generate external productivity e¤ects.
5
dynamic system. While this approach arguably limits the quantitative scope of the model,
it has a number of advantages. One is that the wealth and liquidity e¤ects triggered by
scal shocks can be disentangled analytically. Another one is that the model can handle
continuous variations of the scal policy variables, so that our theoretical impulse-response
functions can be compared directly to their empirical counterparts, and notably to the wealth
of evidence from recent VAR studies.5 While our focus here is on the impact of scal policy
shocks, the construction of a tractable general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents
may be of interest in other contexts.
Finally, Angeletos and Panousi (2009) recently analysed the e¤ect of changes in govern-
ment spending in an incomplete-market economy with idiosyncratic production risk. There
are at least three important di¤erences between their work and ours. First, they study an
economy in which Ricardian equivalence holds, and hence in which there is no liquidity role
for government bonds. Second, they focus on permanent spending shocks (i.e., changes in
the size of the government), whereas our analysis is chiey motivated by the recent empirical
puzzles pertaining to the e¤ect of transitory scal shocks. Third, in their model the wealth
e¤ects associated with higher taxes lower rmslabour demand and lead, under standard
preferences, to a fall in both wages and private consumption. While such supply-side e¤ects
may arguably be at work after a permanent increase in public spending, our purpose here is
to understand when and why transitory spending shocks may generate pro-cyclical private
consumption, labour demand and wages.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents our general framework
with both liquidity-constrained workers (who face idiosyncratic unemployment risk) and en-
trepreneurs (who meet project opportunities randomly). It derives the optimal behaviour
of all agents, describes the government budget constraint and policies, and spells out the
market-clearing conditions in the general case. Section 2 builds on this framework to con-
struct a tractable equilibrium with liquidity-constrained workers; it notably discusses the
importance of wealth and liquidity e¤ects in determining the response of aggregates to s-
cal shocks, examines their dynamic impact via impulse-response analysis, and carries out a
5E.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al. (2004), Caldara and Kamps (2008), Fatas and
Mihov (2001), Favero and Giavazzi (2007), Gali et al. (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), Perotti (2007)
and Ramey (2009).
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number of sensitivity checks. Section 3 studies the impact of scal shocks with liquidity-
constrained entrepreneurs, looking more specically into how liquidity e¤ects a¤ect entre-
preneurslabour demand and hence the equilibrium real wage. While much of this Section
abstracts from unemployment risk, it ends by constructing a tractable equilibrium in which
both workers and entrepreneurs interact and jointly determine the economy-wide demand
for liquidity. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Model
The present Section introduces our general set-up with liquidity constraints and incomplete
markets. The specic classes of equilibria on which we shall focus together with their
associated transmission channels for scal shocksare specied further in Sections 2 and 3.
1.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of innitely-lived households as well as by a gov-
ernment, all interacting in perfectly competitive goods, labour and credit markets. The
mass of households is divided into two subclasses, workers and entrepreneurs (think of the
latter as holding entrepreneurial skills that the former do not). Entrepreneurs are in (ex-
ogenous) proportion  2 [0; 1] in the population. Workers can be employed or unemployed,
while entrepreneurs may run a project or not. More specically, households are subject to
idiosyncratic (i.e., uncorrelated) changes of status, which are modelled as follows.
Workers. Workers face unemployment risk: the status of workers in the labour market
randomly switches between employment, a time during which they freely choose their
labour supply, and unemployment, a status during which they are excluded from the
labour market. Every employed worker has a constant probability e 2 [0; 1) of staying
employed in the next period, and every unemployed worker stays unemployed in the next
period with probability u 2 [0; 1). From their second period of continuous unemployment
onwards, unemployed workers become home producers and get the (constant) income  > 0.6
6It is analytically simpler, but by no means essential, to assume that home production income is available
after a one-period lag.
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Entrepreneurs. The source of idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs is the random
arrival of project opportunities that require funding. More specically, entrepreneurs oscil-
late between two statuses: they may run a project or not. Entrepreneurs running a project
at time t do not supply labour but have access to a constant-returns-to-scale production
function yit+1 = l
f;i
t , where y
i
t+1 is the number of goods produced by entrepreneur i at date
t+1 resulting from having hired lf;it units of labour at date t. When they do not run a project,
entrepreneurs rent out labour to the market and, as do workers, freely choose their labour
supply. These project opportunities arrive randomly at the constant rate 1   2 (0; 1], and
last for   1 periods.7
The individual labour-income uctuations that result from these idiosyncratic status
changes are assumed to be entirely uninsurable (i.e., agents cannot issue assets contingent
on their future employment status, and there are no unemployment benets). In addition,
households face a debt limit that bounds their asset wealth below at all times. To allow for
some, but limited, debt issuance by households, we follow the literature on limited commit-
ment (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and assume that only a quantity   0 of goods is
pledgeable to outside lenders, with borrowers being able to perfectly commit to repay up to
. Denoting by Rt the (riskless) interest rate between date t and date t+ 1, this implies that
lenders will agree to lend a maximum amount of =Rt to any particular borrower at date t,
and that the private bonds resulting from this operation will be perfectly safe and hence
perfect substitutes for government bonds. This debt limit hampers the ability of house-
holds to use private borrowing and lending to fully insulate individual consumption from
idiosyncratic income uctuations. However, privately-issued assets (i.e., inside liquidity)
compete with government bonds (or outside liquidity) in householdsportfolio, and both
will facilitate the formation of bu¤er-stock saving by individual households in equilibrium.8
7Our environment generates tractable equilibria when exit from unemployment is stochastic but not when
the length of entrepreneursprojects is. This is because the optimal behaviour of entrepreneurs running a
project involves a Euler equation with interior solution (see (6) below), and hence stochastic length would
asymptotically generate innitely many entrepreneur types. However, projects can in principle have any
nite, deterministic length.
8Our denitions of insideversus outsideliquidities follows Farhi and Tirole (2009), among others. See
also Holmström and Tirole (1998) on these two forms of liquidity supply.
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The generic budget and non-negativity constraints of a typical household i are given by:
cit + a
i
t + 
i
twtl
f;i
t = a
i
t 1Rt 1 +
 
1  it    it

wtl
i
t + 
i
t 1y
i
t +
 
 it   it 1

  Tt; (1)
cit  0; lit  0; lf;it  0; ait   =Rt: (2)
In equation (1)-(2), cit, l
i
t and l
f;i
t are the consumption demand, labour supply and labour
demand of household i at date t, ait denotes the total quantity of bonds held by household i
at the end of date t, Tt is a (possibly negative) lump-sum tax collected on all households at
date t, and Rt 1 is the (riskless) gross interest rate on bonds from date t  1 to date t, and
wt is the date-t real wage.
it and 
i
t are two indicator variables that summarise both the occupation and the status
of household i. More specically, it = 1 if the household is an entrepreneur currently running
a project and equals zero otherwise, while  it = 1 if the household is an unemployed worker
and is zero otherwise. Indeed, when it = 1 (and hence 
i
t = 0 since the two occupations are
mutually exclusive), the household demands labour (for a total wage bill wtl
f;i
t ) but enjoys
no labour income (so that (1  it    it)wtlit = 0); note also that an entrepreneur who was
running a project in the previous period (i.e., one for whom it 1 = 1) currently enjoys the
entrepreneurial income yit. On the other hand, a worker for whom 
i
t = 1 enjoys no labour
income, while one for whom  it = 0 (so that 1   it    it = 1) enjoys labour income wtlit (as
does an entrepreneur not running a project). Finally, the term
 
 it   it 1

 summarises the
fact that the home production quantity  is earned from the second period of continuous
unemployment onwards. The inequalities in (2) reect both the feasibility constraints (i.e.,
non-negative consumption levels and labour demands and supplies) and the borrowing limit
faced by all households.
Households are assumed to maximise the following intertemporal utility:
Et
1X
j=0
j
 
u
 
cit+j
  lit+j ; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and u(c) is a twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable utility function satisfying u0 (c) > 0; u0 (0) =1, u00 (c) < 0. Note that linearity in the
disutility of labour is key in the construction of our equilibrium with limited heterogeneity.
As will become clear below, the implied high elasticity of labour supply means that work-
ers who have just left unemployment and entrepreneurs whose project has just come to an
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end are willing to work as much as necessary to instantaneously replete their precautionary
wealth. If this were not the case, the labour supply and asset holdings of these households
would depend on their entire idiosyncratic history and the number of agent types (and as-
sociated Euler equations) would be very large. We analyse the robustness of our result with
respect to this assumption in Section 2.4 below, where we develop a variant of the model
with inelastic labour supply and partial risk-sharing.
We may now characterise any household is optimal plans. Let us start with the intratem-
poral labour supply choice rst. Neither entrepreneurs running a project nor unemployed
workers derive income from supplying labour. Hence, any household for whom it = 1 or
 it = 1 chooses l
i
t = 0. For those who sell some of their labour endowment to the market
(i.e., employed workers or entrepreneurs not running a project), equations (1)(3) imply that
their optimal labour supply is lit satisfying:
wtu
0  ait 1Rt 1 + wtlit + it 1yit   Tt   ait = 1: (4)
Turning to the intertemporal optimality condition, (1)(3) imply that the Euler equation
summarising household is optimal asset holdings, ait; is given by:
u0

ait 1Rt 1 +
 
1  it    it

wtl
i
t + 
i
t 1y
i
t   Tt   ait   itwtlf;it


RtEtu
0

aitRt +
 
1  it+1    it+1

wt+1l
i
t+1 + 
i
ty
i
t+1 + 
i
t+1
i
t  Tt+1   ait+1   it+1wt+1lf;it+1

;
(5)
with (5) holding with strict inequality if the borrowing constraint is binding (so that the
corner solution ait =  =Rt prevails), and with equality otherwise (in which case ait >  =Rt
is an interior solution).
The last relevant intertemporal choice in our model is that of entrepreneurs currently
running a project (i.e., those for whom  it = 
i
t+1 = 0 and 
i
t = 1). Indeed, since their
technology involves a production lag, these entrepreneurs trade o¤ current consumption for
current labour demand, which raises future production and consumption. Assuming that
this choice is interior (which will always be the case under our assumed preferences and
technology), we nd that the optimal labour demand of entrepreneurs currently running a
10
project, lf;it , satises:
u0(ait 1Rt 1 + 
i
t 1y
i
t   Tt   ait   wtlf;it ) =
w 1t Etu
0(aitRt +
 
1  it+1

wt+1l
i
t+1 + l
f;i
t   Tt+1   ait+1   it+1wt+1lf;it+1): (6)
Comparing equations (5) and (6), we nd that the borrowing constraint will be binding
for these entrepreneurs if and only if:
1=wt > Rt: (7)
The interpretation of inequality (7) is straightforward. For entrepreneurs running a
project, and given the production function yit = l
f;i
t 1, any unit of funds used to raise labour
inputs today will generate a payo¤ of 1=wt in the next period. On the other hand, any
unit of funds invested in bonds will yield Rt in the next period. Such entrepreneurs are
borrowing-constrained if they never wish to hold assets, but instead would like to borrow
as much as possible and to invest the borrowed funds in their own project (up to the point
where the borrowing limit is reached). For this to be the case, the unit return on investing
in the project must be higher than the unit borrowing cost, i.e., 1=wt > Rt.
1.2 Government
Let Gt and Tt denote government consumption and lump-sum taxes during period t, respec-
tively, and Bt the stock of public debt at the end of period t. The government faces the
budget constraint:
Bt 1Rt 1 +Gt = Bt + Tt: (8)
In equation (8), we think of transitory variations in Gt as being exogenously chosen by
the government, of Bt as adjusting endogenously over time depending on the primary decit
and the equilibrium interest rate, and of Tt as obeying a scal rule with feedback from
macroeconomic and/or scal variables. Following the observation by Bohn (1998) that the
US debt-GDP ratio is stationary, we restrict our attention to rules ensuring that public debt
reverts towards its (exogenous) long-run target B, at least asymptotically. Such rules, which
exclude Ponzi schemes, are consistent with a wide variety of feedback mechanisms, including
ones linking public debt to primary decit as in Bohn (1998), output and debt to structural
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decits (e.g., Gali and Perotti, 2003), as well as public debt and public spending to taxes
(e.g., Gali et al., 2007). Loosely speaking, stationarity requires that the tax feedback be
su¢ ciently strong never to allow public debt to drift away from target forever.
Later on we shall illustrate the dynamics of the model in the context of a specic class of
a scal rule and a shock process that satisfy this stationarity requirement. While our main
focus is on the e¤ects of government spending shocks, we will also study the impact of tax
cuts, both for the sake of completeness and to compare the e¤ectiveness of the two policies.
The scal rule and shock processes that we consider are as follows:
Tt = T +  (Bt  B)  T ct ; (9)
Gt =  Gt 1 + 1;t; T ct = T
c
t 1 + 2;t; (10)
where T denotes steady-state taxes, B steady-state public debt (i.e., the long-run target),
 > 0 and ( ; ) 2 (0; 1)2 constant parameters, T ct a transitory tax cut variable, and 1;t and
2;t are innovations to public spending and tax cuts, respectively. Note that the qualitative
properties of the model are robust to the inclusion of other feedbacks in (9) (e.g., from Gt to
Tt), as well as to a lagged (rather than simultaneous) reaction of taxes to public debt. What
matters for our results is the possibility that scal shocks may entail signicant variations
in the stock of public debt, at least in the short run.
Public debt will remain stationary as long as the policy parameter  in (9) is su¢ ciently
large.9 Provided that this is the case,  e¤ectively indexes the way in which scal expansions
are nanced at various horizons. If  is large, taxes rise quickly following a scal expansion,
and public debt plays a relatively minor role in their short-run nancing. Smaller values of
, on the contrary, imply a muted short-run response of taxes and a more substantial role
for public debt issuance in the short run; the ensuing rise in the stock of public debt then
eventually triggers a rise in taxes in the medium run until the reversion of the public debt
has been completed. Finally, the assumption that steady-state government consumption is
zero in equation (10) is made for expositional clarity and entails no loss of generality; here
it implies that in the steady state, tax revenues only just cover interest rate payments on
public debt, i.e., T = B (R  1).10
9For example, inequality (33) below ensures stationarity in the particular case where  =  = 0.
10The non-Ricardian nature of the model implies that R  1 may be negative if steady-state public debt,
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1.3 Market clearing
There are two assets in the economy, public and private bonds and, as explained above, the
two are perfect substitutes here. Then, denoting as Ft (~a; ; ), with ~a 2 [ =Rt;+1) and
(; ) 2 f0; 1gf0; 1g; the measure at date t of agents with beginning-of-period asset wealth
~a and with current status summarised by (; ), clearing of the bonds market requires that:11X
(;)2f0;1g2
Z +1
 =Rt
atdFt (~a; ; ) = Bt: (11)
This equality states that the sum of the bonds held by all agents at the end of date t
adds up to the amount of public debt. Note that equation (11) reects the fundamental
di¤erence between inside and outside liquidity from the point of view of the private sector.
Namely, privately-issued assets enter individual wealth (i.e., at), but their quantity sums to
zero since the private sector both issues and buys them. In contrast, government bonds are
bought but not issued by the private sector. Thus, in the aggregate the private sector holds
a net quantity of assets Bt.
Similarly, the labour market clears when total labour demand equals supply, i.e.,X
(;)2f0;1g2
Z +1
 =Rt
ltdFt (~a; ; ) =
X
(;)2f0;1g2
Z +1
 =Rt
lft dFt (~a; ; )  Lt: (12)
Finally, denoting by Yt aggregate output, the goods market clears if and only if:X
(;)2f0;1g2
Z +1
 =Rt
ctdFt (~a; ; ) +Gt = Yt: (13)
We may now dene an equilibrium of our economy as a set of individual consumption
levels, fcig1t=0, individual labour supplies and demand, flit; lf;it g1t=0, individual bond holdings,
faitg1t=0, and aggregate variables, fLt; Yt; Bt; Rt; wtg1t=0 such that the optimality conditions
(4)(6) and the market-clearing conditions (11)(13) hold for every agent and in every period,
given the forcing sequence fGtg1t=0 and a scal rule for Tt that ensures the stationarity of
public debt.
B, is su¢ ciently low. In this case, the steady-state tax collection becomes a positive transfer of amount  T
(the bounds on R and the relation between R and B are detailed in Appendix A1).
11This formulation of the market-clearing conditions anticipates the recursive nature of our limited-
heterogeneity equilibria, in which these conditions take very simple forms. See Heathcote (2005) for a
general, non-recursive formulation.
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1.4 Limited-heterogeneity equilibria
In general, uninsurable income uncertainty of the kind assumed here generates a very large
number of household types, due to the dependence of current decisions on the households
entire history of individual shocks, and the distribution of types must be approximated
numerically (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Heathcote, 2005). Here we focus on particular class of
equilibria with a limited number of household types and a nite-state wealth distribution,
allowing us to derive the models dynamics in closed form. We construct these equilibria
using a simple guess and verifymethod based on two conjectures, and then derive su¢ cient
conditions for both conjectures to hold in equilibrium once all their behavioural and market-
clearing implications have been worked out. As stated in Propositions 1 and 2 below, the
su¢ cient conditions for both conjectures to hold are that i) public debt trend-revert towards
a su¢ ciently low long-run target, and ii) deviations of public debt from target be of limited
magnitude.
The rst conjecture (C1) is that the borrowing constraint is always binding for both
unemployed workers and entrepreneurs who run a project. This is because the former expect
to leave unemployment with positive probability in the next period, while the latter gather
output from their current investment in the next period. Hence, both types face a rising
income prole and, in the equilibria that we consider, exhaust the debt limit =Rt (i.e.,
they would like to extend borrowing beyond =Rt but are prevented from doing so). The
second conjecture (C2) is that the borrowing constraint is never binding for labour-supplying
households, which is to say, employed workers and entrepreneurs not currently running a
project. This is because the former contemplate, and hence self-insure against, the possibility
of falling into unemployment, while the latter hoard assets for future potential investment
opportunities. In consequence, these households are willing to end the current period with
non-negative asset wealth and hence to buy both government bonds and the assets issued
by borrowing-constrained households. As we illustrate in the next sections, conjectures C1-
C2 together with the utility function (3) generically imply the existence of equilibria with
nite-state, cross-sectional wealth distributions and hence with a nite number of agent
types.
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2 Fiscal policy shocks with liquidity-constrained work-
ers
In the present section, we focus on the case where the only source of idiosyncratic uncertainty
in the economy consists of unemployment risk. Consequently, we shut down the entrepre-
neurial sector (i.e.,  = 0) and instead endow the economy with an external rm sector
producing output with constant returns-to-scale technology Yt = Lt (so that wt = 1 8t). We
rst determine householdsindividual consumption, labour supply and asset holding rules
under conjecturesC1-C2 (2.1). We then characterise the equilibrium that results from these
rules and provide an existence proposition for our limited-heterogeneity equilibrium (2.2).
Our next step is to derive the aggregate dynamics of the model under a number of speci-
cations, highlighting in each case the central role of the dynamic liquidity e¤ects triggered
by scal shocks (2.3). Finally, we study a variant of the model that enables us to study how
the elasticity of labour supply a¤ects equilibrium outcomes (2.4).
2.1 Agent types
Consider rst the consumption level of a worker who is unemployed both in the previous and
the current period (and call this worker a uu worker). Under conjecture C1, this worker
left the previous period with asset wealth  =Rt 1. At the end of the current period, this
worker will have earned the home production income , repaid  (= (=Rt 1)Rt 1) to the
lenders and, again by conjecture C1, renewed his debt up to the amount =Rt. We thus
have:
uu : cuut =    + =Rt   Tt: (14)
Now consider the consumption level of a worker who is falling into unemployment in
the current period. By denition this worker was employed, and thus unconstrained under
C2, in the previous period, but is currently constrained under C1. Thus, for this worker
equation (1) gives:  
 it 1; 
i
t

= (0; 1)) cit = ait 1Rt 1   Tt + =Rt; (15)
where ait 1 is worker is bond holdings inherited from the previous period and =Rt (=  ait)
this workers current debt. From (1)(3), the intratemporal optimality condition for any
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employed household i imposes that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption be equal to the real wage, so that we obtain:
 it = 0) cit = ce = u0 1(1): (16)
Any employed household stays employed in the next period with probability e and
falls into unemployment with probability 1   e. Conjecture C2 implies that employed
householdsconsumption-savings plans are interior (i.e., ait > 0 if 
i
t = 1) and, from (3), (15)
and (16), that these plans obey the following Euler equation:
1 = eRt +  (1  e)RtEtu0(aitRt   Tt+1 + =Rt+1): (17)
The left-hand side of equation (17) is the current marginal utility of an employed house-
hold, u0(ce) = 1. The rst part of the right-hand side of (17) is the discounted utility of a
marginal unit of savings if the household stays employed in the next period (in which case
u0(cit+1) = u
0(ce) = 1), while the second part is the marginal utility of the same unit when the
household falls into unemployment in the next period (i.e., becomes unemployed, liquidates
assets and, from equation (15), enjoys marginal utility u0(cit+1) = u
0(aitRt   Tt+1 + =Rt+1)).
In equation (17), household is current asset demand only depends on aggregate variables
(Rt and Tt). The solution ait to (17) is thus identical across employed households, and we
can write:
 it = 0) ait = aet (> 0) 8i: (18)
Equations (15) and (18) imply that workers currently falling into unemployment have
identical asset holdings and consumption levels, so that we can write:
eu : ceut = a
e
t 1Rt 1   Tt + =Rt: (19)
Employed workers can be of two di¤erent types, depending on whether or not they were
employed in the previous period. Call the former ee workersand the latter ue workers. In
the current period, ue workers consume ce and save aet . Moreover, since they were borrowing-
constrained at date t  1 (by conjecture C1) and thus ended the previous period with debt
=Rt 1, they must repay  in the current period. Then, equations (1), (16) and (18) yield
the labour supply of ue workers, luet (which is homogenous across such households) as the
residual of the following equation:
ue : ce + aet = l
ue
t   Tt   : (20)
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On the other hand, ee households consume ce, save aet , and enjoy the asset payo¤a
e
t 1Rt 1.
This also uniquely denes their labour supply, leet ; through the equation:
ee : ce + aet = a
e
t 1Rt 1 + l
ee
t   Tt: (21)
To summarise, C1 and C2 imply that workers can be of four di¤erent types only (with
budget constraints (14) and (19)(21)), while the equilibrium wealth distribution is two-
state (i.e., ait = a
e
t > 0 or  =Rt  0). Note that it is almost sure, asymptotically, that
any two randomly chosen workers have di¤erent individual income histories, due to the
idiosyncratic nature of unemployment shocks. Nevertheless, under our conjectures workers
heterogeneity is limited by the fact that only last periods and current idiosyncratic shocks
matter in determining workerstypes. This is because, under C1 and C2, i) workers falling
into unemployment all liquidate their asset wealth and borrow =Rt, and ii) workers leaving
unemployment adjust labour supply so as to reach their target level of precautionary wealth,
aet , instantaneously.
12 Given the assumed probabilities of changing employment status, the
invariant proportions of each type of worker are:
!uu =
u (1  e)
2  e   u ; !
eu = !ue =
(1  e) (1  u)
2  e   u and !
uu =
u (1  e)
2  e   u , (22)
and we denote the asymptotic unemployment rate by
 = !uu+!eu = (1  e) = (2  e   u).
For simplicity, we assume that the proportion of each type of worker is at the invariant dis-
tribution level from t = 0 onwards (so that 
 is the unemployment rate at all dates).
2.2 Equilibrium
In our economy, only employed workers hold bonds, which are issued both by the government
(to the amount Bt) and by the unemployed (for a total amount =Rt  
). Given the
distribution of workers types, the bond, labour and goods markets clearing conditions (11)
12In reality individual asset depletion and repletion following changes in labour income are gradual rather
than immediate. Our focus on a tractable analysis of aggregate scal shocks under incomplete markets and
agentsheterogeneity requires that we abstract from this inertia in individual asset adjustments, except in
Section 2.4 below where we analyse this issue explicitly. Of course, the individual wealth target itself, aet ;
will vary over time following scal policy shocks.
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(13) become:
(1  
) aet   
=Rt = Bt; (23)
!eeleet + !
ueluet = Lt; (24)
(1  
) ce + !euceut + !uu (cuut   ) +Gt = Yt; (25)
where in (25) Yt(= Lt) is production by the outside rm sector and Yt+!uu is total output.
Substituting (8), (16) and (23) into the Euler equation (17), we may write the relation
between the interest rate and scal variables as follows:
1 = Rt

e + (1  e)Etu0

Bt+1  Gt+1 + 
Tt+1
1  
 + 



1  
 +
1
Rt+1

: (26)
Note that when e ! 1 idiosyncratic uncertainty about labour income vanishes; the
model then behaves in the same way as a (frictionless) Real Business Cycle model and
Rt ! 1=, the gross rate of time preference. We may now state the following existence
proposition (the proof of which is found in Appendix A1).
Proposition 1. Assume that i)  (c)   cu00 (c) =u0 (c)  1, ii) u is small, iii) uctuations
of Bt around its steady-state value B are small, and iv) (B; ) jointly satisfy:
0 < B +  <   (1  
) u
0 1 (1)
(1  
)  + 
 :
Then, the equilibrium with four worker types exists and has an interest rate Rt that is strictly
lower than 1= for all t.
In short, Proposition 1 indicates that our economy is liquidity-constrained if the stocks
of public debt, as given by B in the steady state, and private debt, as indexed by , are
both su¢ ciently low. In this case, the equilibrium interest rate is also low (relative to that
prevailing in an unconstrained economy), due to the precautionary demand for bonds by
high-income workers.13 From here on, we shall proceed under the assumption that bonds are
in limited supply at all dates, i.e., conditions iii) and iv) in Proposition 1 always hold, and
we will make sure in our calibration exercises that u is su¢ ciently small for unemployed
workers to be constrained so that condition ii) also holds. Finally, condition i) is part of
13These properties essentially parallel those obtained by Woodford (1990) within a liquidity-constrained
economy without inside liquidity and in which both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainties are shut down.
18
our set of su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a unique steady state, but it may be
relaxed for particular ranges of parameters without compromising steady-state uniqueness.
We illustrate this point below by performing sensitivity analysis with respect to  (c).
2.3 Liquidity versus wealth e¤ects of scal expansions
In this section we begin by demonstrating how liquidity and wealth e¤ects compete in de-
termining the overall response of aggregate- and individual-level variables to scal shocks,
and then illustrate the implied dynamic e¤ects of these shocks under the scal rule (9).
Total consumption by employed households is (1  
) ce, while the total consumption of
unemployed households is 
cut . Then, using (8), (19) and (23) and rearranging, total private
consumption and total output may be written respectively as:
Ct = 	 + (1  e) (Bt  Gt) + Tt + 
R 1t ; (27)
Yt = 	 + (1  e)Bt + eGt + Tt + 
R 1t ; (28)
where 	  (1  
) ce + 
 ((1  e   u)  + u) and   
 (1  e   u) are constants.
These static, reduced-form equations provide a rst insight into how liquidity e¤ects alter
the transmission of scal shock relative to that at work in the complete-markets model. To
illustrate this point in the simplest possible manner, let us assume that  = 0 here and
consider the following three prototypical scal experiments. Henceforth, we shall use hatted
variables to denote level-deviations from the steady state (e.g., B^ = Bt   B), and we will
assume that all variables are at their steady-state values before the policy shock.
Fully debt-nanced spending shock. Imagine rst the e¤ect of a purely transitory rise in public
spending occurring at date t (of size Gt > 0) that is entirely nanced by public debt (so that
T^t = 0 and B^t = Gt), the implied increase in taxes necessary to satisfy the governments
intertemporal budget constraint being left to some future periods. For concreteness, let us
assume that this increase in taxes will take place only two periods after the policy change
and will allow public debt to return to its steady state-level B at the end of date t+ 2 (i.e.,
T^t+1 = 0 and T^t+2 > 0 such that B^t+2 = 0). Equation (27) indicates that total private
consumption does not change on impact (i.e., C^t = 0), while by equation (28) Y^t = Gt. Now
looking one period ahead: by assumption, G^t+1 = 0 while T^t+1 = 0, which in turn implies
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that C^t+1 = (1  e) B^t+1. Then, using the government budget constraint (8) at dates t and
t+ 1; we obtain:
C^t+1 = (1  e) (BtRt  BR) = (1  e) (BR^t +RtGt):
Hence, unless the interest rate falls so much at the time of the policy impulse that the
stock of public debt actually decreases, this policy generates a boom in private consumption
one period after the shock. As we discuss later on, the crowding inof private consumption
by government spending occurs under much more realistic scal rules and policy changes.
What is crucial here is the fact that public debt, which a¤ects the stock of aggregate liquidity,
is allowed to increase following the policy change; this increase raises the consumption level
that agents hit by a bad idiosyncratic income shock can achieve, and hence raises aggregate
consumption. The central role of public debt in this transmission channel is best understood
when we look at the opposite situation of a full tax nancing of the spending shock.
Fully tax-nanced spending shock. Take exactly the same transitory increase in public spend-
ing, but assume instead that it is entirely nanced by taxes (i.e., T^t = Gt and B^t = 0), so
that public debt never leaves its steady-state value. From equation (27), we have that
C^t = ( + 
e   1)Gt (< 0);
with Ct returning to its steady-state value from date t + 1 onwards. Hence, this policy
triggers a drop in total private consumption. The cause of this decline is that such a policy
does not change the aggregate amount of liquidity in the economy, and hence leaves workers
self-insurance possibilities una¤ected. Consequently, the usual wealth e¤ects dominate and
lead to private consumption being crowded out by public spending as in the baseline Real
Business Cycle model.
Change in the timing of taxes. Finally, consider the textbook Ricardian experiment of
a debt-nanced cut in lump-sum taxes, nanced by future tax increases, with the entire
path of government consumption remaining at zero (so that Ct = Yt for all t). Again, for
concreteness assume that this policy takes place at date t (i.e., B^t =  T^t) and that taxes
will rise in the next period to ensure the reversion of public debt towards its steady state
level (i.e., T^t+1 > 0 such that B^t+1 = 0). From equation (27)(28), we have
C^t = (1  e  ) B^t (> 0),
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so that the tax cut raises private consumption and output on impact. (Recall that this
experiment would be neutral under Ricardian equivalence.) As we discuss further below,
tax cuts leading to a persistently high stock of public debt also raise aggregate liquidity and
workers self-insurance opportunities, which substantially strengthens the direct e¤ect of the
cut on the budget set of liquidity-constrained workers.
To obtain further insight into the underlying workings of these e¤ects, we need to go
beyond the reduced-form equations (27)(28) and look at household-level variables, which
describe how individual consumption (i.e. the private demand side of the model) and labour
supply (the supply side) respond to scal shocks. The consumption of employed workers, ce,
is not a¤ected by scal shocks. Now, substituting (23) into (19) we may write ceut as follows:
ceut =
Bt 1Rt 1
1  
 +


1  
| {z }
liquidated portfolio
+

Rt|{z}
borrowing
  Tt|{z}
taxes
: (29)
The right-hand side of (29) is composed of four terms that all a¤ect the consumption of
eu workers. The sum of the rst two terms is the total value of their liquidated portfolio in
equilibrium, which depends on how much bu¤er-stock saving they were able to form in the
previous period (as they were employed); this stock is a¤ected by the quantity of outside
liquidity in the economy (Bt 1 in the Bt 1Rt 1= (1  
) term) as well as by that of inside
liquidity, which depends on constrained workerspledgeable income  (the 
= (1  
) term).
Besides liquidating their asset portfolio, eu workers smooth consumption by borrowing (up
to the debt limit =Rt). Finally, since these workers are borrowing-constrained, higher taxes
reduce their attainable consumption level one for one (the  Tt term). As we illustrate below,
the interest rate responds positively to a rise in public debt. This in turn raises the liquidated
value of workersportfolio, but also generates some crowding out of private borrowing; hence,
the economys response to scal shocks will be smaller the higher is the share of private debt
in the total stock of assets (that is, the higher is  relative to B). The determinants of uu
workersconsumption (see equation (14)) directly follows. Since they were constrained in
the previous period (and hence liquidated their asset portfoo), they can only raise current
consumption above home production by borrowing (up to =Rt). However, they must also
repay  to their creditors and pay the lump sum tax Tt.
Turning to the supply side of the model, we can substitute (16) and (23) into (20)(21)
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and write labour supply by employed households as follows:
leet = c
e +
Bt  Bt 1Rt 1
1  
 +


1  


1
Rt
  1

+ Tt; (30)
luet = c
e +
Bt
1  
 +


(1  
)
1
Rt
+ Tt: (31)
Equations (30)(31) show that labour supply responds not only to taxes, as is predicted
by the standard complete-markets model, but also to the stock of liquidity that households
acquire as self-insurance against unemployment risk. ue workers, who have just moved out
of unemployment and have zero beginning-of-period wealth, will seize any extra opportunity
to save by raising labour supply; ee workers, who are partly self-insured when they enter
the current period, adjust their labour supply depending on the new stock of government
and private bonds available for purchase relative to the current value of their previously-
accumulated portfolio. In both cases, the growth of public debt that may result from higher
public spending generates liquidity e¤ects that strengthen the wealth e¤ects on labour supply.
As is shown in Appendix A2, under (9)(10), the behaviour of the model with liquidity-
constrained workers can be approximated by a two-dimensional dynamic system with en-
dogenous state vector [Rt; Bt]. To gain further insight into these dynamics, and notably
about the role of  in determining the stability of the system, it may be useful to look
further into our baseline scenario, in which  = 0 (so that the only source of liquidity in the
economy is from government bonds). When this is the case, the dynamics of the model be-
come univariate and are summarised by the following linearised debt process (see Appendix
A2 for details):14
Bt = (1  )B + Bt 1 + Gt + Gt 1 + T ct + T ct 1; (32)
where Gt and T ct are given by (10),  > 0, ;  > 0,  < 0 are constants that depend
on the deep parameters of the model and the target debt level B, and where @=@ < 0
(i.e., a stronger tax reaction speeds up the reversion of public debt towards target). Finally,
equations (8) and (27)(28) give the values of Rt, Ct and Yt as functions of Bt and Gt.
Since  > 0, stationarity of public debt requires that  < 1. As is shown in Appendix
A2, this condition is equivalent to:
14The univariate debt dynamics (32) is obtained by combining the (backward-looking) government budget
constraint (8) and the (forward-looking) Euler equation (26). Both are nonlinear and need to be linearised
to be merged into (32).
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 > min  R  1 + 
1  
 ; with  
(1  eR) (ceu)R
1  
 + 
R > 0; (33)
and where 1  
 > 0 and R > 0 is uniquely dened by the target debt level B.
To illustrate the dynamic impact of liquidity and wealth e¤ects in our economy, we draw
impulse-response functions for all relevant variables using equation (32) together with (8),
(9)-(10) and (27)(28). Our benchmark (quarterly) parameters are  = 0:98, e = 0:95,
u = 0:20 (this generates an unemployment rate of 
 ' 5:88%),  = 0,  = 0:6,  =  =
0:95, the (unique) value of B such that R = 1:01, and u (c) = ln c.
Figure 1 displays the responses of our variables under study to government spending
and tax cut shocks. Time-series evidence on the dynamic behaviour of public debt reports
a very slow reversion of the debt-GDP ratio towards its long-run mean (e.g., Bohn, 1998;
Gali et al., 2007). We take  = 0:2 as our benchmark for the responsiveness of taxes, which
produces such a slow reversion, and we also study the cases in which  = 0:15 and  = 1:2.
Unsurprisingly, liquidity e¤ects are stronger when  = 0:15, and hence so are the responses
of the aggregates. While setting  = 1:2 is clearly unrealistic, it is useful as a counterfactual
experiment since, as argued above, a quick tax reaction and a small increase in public debt
takes our economys response to the shocks close to that which would be implied by a baseline
RBC model.
Let us take government spending shocks rst. The case in which  = 0:2 illustrates
a situation where liquidity e¤ects dominate wealth e¤ects on total private consumption,
except at the very moment of the shock, due to the substantial increase in public debt and
the implied improvement in households self-insurance opportunities. (Note that private
consumption tracks public debt, and is thus far more persistent than the shock itself.) As a
result, the output e¤ect of a spending shock is large, in the sense that the spending multiplier
is greater than one almost all along the adjustment path. In contrast, wealth e¤ects dominate
when  = 1:2, due to the limited increase in public debt and the rapid reaction of taxes,
resulting in a negative response of private consumption all along the transition path; in
consequence, the government-spending multiplier is always smaller than one in this case.
Holding other parameters constant, values of  between 0:2 and 1:2 (not represented here)
cause private consumption to start falling below its steady-state level for several periods
(during which public debt and implied liquidity e¤ects are still limited), and then rise above
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 1. Liquidity-constrained households: baseline case. The gure displays
the level deviation from steady state of taxes (Tt), public debt (Bt), private consumption (Ct),
output (Yt) and the real interest rate (Rt), following a public spending shock (Panel A) or a
tax cut shock (Panel B) of 5% of steady-state output. Three values of the policy responsiveness
parameter are considered (the benchmark is  = 0:2).
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its steady-state level for the rest of the adjustment period (after public debt has risen enough
to make the liquidity e¤ects prevalent).
Tax cuts also have strong expansionary e¤ects, whether  = 0:15 or 0:2, for two reasons.
First, liquidity-constrained workers consume the tax rebate one for one (see the  Tt part in
(29)). Second, the cut raises public debt and hence aggregate liquidity (the (2  e)Bt 1Rt 1
part in (29)). Both channels are much weaker (but still active) when  = 1:2.
Sensitivity. Figure 2 shows how changes in some key parameters of the model alter the
dynamic responses of private consumption and output to scal shocks. Panel A considers
di¤erent degrees of risk aversion, with u (c) = c1 = (1  ),  > 0. As discussed above,
the requirement that   1 is not necessary for our equilibrium to remain well behaved;
we veried numerically that it is so when  = 2 and the other parameters are at their
baseline values. Interestingly, the responses of consumption and output are larger when risk
aversion rises (or, equivalently, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution IESfalls).
The reason for this is that high risk aversion/low IES make agents less willing to substitute
current consumption for future consumption following the shock, leading bonds to command
a higher return in equilibrium. For a given value of the tax rule parameter, this stronger
reaction of the interest rate induces a larger response of public debt and hence stronger
liquidity e¤ects. Panel B studies the impact of alternative persistence parameters. Note
that in the case of a spending shock, higher persistence leads to both greater wealth e¤ects
(since the present value of total taxes is higher) and greater liquidity e¤ects (since, for a given
tax rule, higher public spending leads to a stronger debt response to the shock); the rst
two graphs indicate that liquidity e¤ects are more a¤ected than wealth e¤ects by an increase
in the persistence parameter. Panel C relaxes the assumption that the unemployed have
no borrowing capacity. There is now a whole range of pairs (B; ) consistent with both our
conjectured equilibrium and the requirement that R = 1:01, of which  = 0 (i.e., our baseline
economy without inside liquidity, the bold line) is one particular instance. Intuitively, by
setting the same value of R for the three specications we force them to share similar levels
of steady-state aggregate (i.e., inside plus outside) liquidity, but allow the composition of
aggregate liquidity to vary across specications. Panel C shows that raising the share of
private debt in total liquidity weakens the responses of all variables. The reason for this is
the
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A. Alternative degrees of risk aversion
B. Alternative shock persistence
C. Alternative liquidity composition
Figure 2. Liqudity-constrained households: sensitivity. The gure displays the
responses of private consumption (Ct) and output (Yt) to government spending and tax cut shocks
(note that output equals consumption in the case of a tax cut). The baseline calibration (bold
curves) is  = 1,  =  = 0:95;  = 0 and B such that R = 1:01. Each panel show how changes
in each parameter alter impulse responses, holding other parameters at their baseline values.
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crowding out of private debt by public debt that takes place after either type of scal
expansion. Recall that, in the economy without inside liquidity (Figure 1), these shocks raise
the real interest rate. With inside liquidity, this higher rate reduces unemployed workers
ability to borrow (since =Rt is smaller) and hence their consumption demand moves less
than in the baseline economy. Moreover, fewer assets are issued by the private sector, which
reduces householdsability to self-insure when employed.
It may be useful at this stage to compare our results with those in Gali et al. (2007),
who show that a variant of the dynamic New Keynesian model can produce a positive
consumption response to spending shocks. While both models put the emphasis on liquidity-
constrained households and decit nancing, the channels underlying the procyclicality of
consumption di¤er substantially between the two models. In Gali et al., both aggregate
output and employment are demand-determined, due to sticky prices and real wage rigidities,
and a share of the population is made of hand-to-mouthworkers who consume all of their
extra disposable income. Since government spending raises total demand and output, it
raises the wage bill and hence the consumption of these workers one for one; then, private
consumption rises if these workers are in su¢ ciently large number. By contrast, in the model
described above all prices are fully exible, so that such (Keynesian) aggregate demand
e¤ects are inoperative; moreover, liquidity-constrained agents are unemployed, which makes
their labour income unresponsive to scal shocks. What ultimately matters here for the
procyclical response of private consumption is the ability of these agents to have built up
their precautionary wealth when they were employed, which is in turn determined by the
stock of public debt.
2.4 Imperfectly-elastic labour supply and gradual asset accumu-
lation: an economy with partial risk-sharing
As discussed above, our assumption of linear labour disutility is crucial in generating an
equilibrium with a nite-state, cross-sectional distribution of wealth, for it implies that, at
the individual level, workers leaving unemployment are willing to work as much as necessary
to reach their target level of precautionary wealth instantaneously. However, this functional
form also tends to magnify the aggregate response to scal shocks, relative to an economy
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with lower labour-supply elasticity. Consider, for example, the extreme situation in which
labour supply would be completely inelastic, so that output would be entirely unresponsive
to scal shocks (since labour is the only variable input here). In this situation, tax cuts would
not a¤ect total private consumption or output (although they could have signicant cross-
sectional e¤ects). Since spending shocks would not a¤ect output either, private consumption
would necessarily be crowed out, rather than crowded in, by public spending. In short, the
responses of consumption, output and other aggregates to scal shocks depend crucially on
both the size of liquidity e¤ects and the willingness of private agents to alter their labour
supply after the policy impulse.
To assess the robustness of our results with respect to the elasticity of labour supply,
whilst maintaining both tractability and continuity with our previous analysis, we construct
an economy with partial risk sharing that has the property of nesting our baseline model
with liquidity-constrained workers (and no risk sharing at all) as a special case. For the sake
of conciseness, we discuss the implications of this partial risk sharing arrangement mostly
informally here and leave much of the corresponding algebra in Appendix A3.
We assume here that full risk sharing can take place between employed workers, but only
from the second period of continuous employment onwards. This risk-sharing arrangement
is akin to the familyinterpretation of the representative agent model when the underlying
agents (i.e., the family members) are heterogenous (e.g., Lucas, 1990, Andolfato, 1996); the
di¤erence is that we restrict family membership to a subclass of workers, depending on their
labour market history: they leave the family when they fall into employment, taking their
fair share of the familys assets with them, and re-enter the family when they have been
employed for two consecutive periods. All resources (that is, asset and labour income net of
taxes) are pooled within the family.
This simple risk-sharing structure has, under conjectures C1-C2, the following proper-
ties. First, the precautionary saving motive is maintained by the threat of family exclusion.
Second, tractability is maintained (despite the imperfect elasticity of labour supply) since,
even though workers gradually accumulate assets (i.e., those just leaving unemployment hold
less asset than after two employment periods), all family members have the same consump-
tion and saving rules. Third, the economy becomes exactly identical to one without risk
sharing when labour supply is perfectly elastic. Indeed, when such is the case, workers leav-
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ing unemployment work as much as necessary to acquire the same asset wealth as that of
family members; this in turn implies that risk sharing within the family becomes redundant
(see Appendix A3 for details). As a consequence, we can study how changes in the elastic-
ity of labour supply alter the e¤ectiveness of scal policy by continuity with our baseline
economy.
We assume that the instant utility function takes the form u (c) v (l) = ln c l1+= (1 + ) ;
  0, and we compare the behaviour of our baseline model (i.e.,  = 0) to one in which
the labour elasticity parameter  takes the higher value of 1 (as in, for example, Christiano
et al., 2005). Figure 3 shows the paths of taxes, debt, private consumption, as well as the
components of labour supply, under the same paths for public spending and tax cuts as in
Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, a higher value of , holding the policy rule parameter  constant, is
associated with a smaller response of aggregates to both public spending and tax cut shocks
(again, recall that under fully inelastic labour supply those shocks would not a¤ect output
at all). The reason for this is that a value of  higher than zero makes agents less willing to
supply labour to purchase the available stock of liquidity. Consequently, asset accumulation
is gradual (see equations (A11)(A12) in Appendix A3), and output is less responsive to
the shocks. Since the path of government spending is exogenous, a muted output response
implies that a spending shock is more likely to lead to a crowding out of private consumption
(this is notably the case when we set  = 1 and  = 0:2). Let us note, however, that in this
case a strenghtening of liquidity e¤ects may restore crowding in, though later in time (e.g.,
when  = 1 and  = 0:1). To summarise, while output always rises after a spending shock
provided that  < 1, the overall e¤ect of the shock on consumption depends on both the
willingness of workers to supply labour (as indexed ) and on the intensity of liquidity e¤ects
(as determined by the policy rule parameter ). In contrast, tax cut shocks always have
expansionary e¤ects on both output and private consumption (again, as long as  <1).
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 3. Liqudity-constrained households: imperfectly elastic labour sup-
ply. The gure displays the responses of taxes (Tt), public debt (Bt), private consumption (Ct) as
well as aggregate (Lt) and disaggregated (leet ; l
ee
t ) labour supplies for di¤erent values of the labour
elasticity () and the policy rule () parameters. In all calibrations we set  = 1,  =  = 0:95,
and choose the appropriate value of B such that R = 1:01.
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3 Fiscal policy shocks with liquidity-constrained entre-
preneurs
Our analysis has thus far focused on the way in which liquidity e¤ects may a¤ect the labour
supply and consumption demand of private agents. We now wish to study how the quantity
of aggregate liquidity may a¤ect labour demand and the equilibrium real wage, in addition to
determining individual consumption levels. So that the channels we emphasise will remain
transparent, we proceed in three steps. We rst derive in Section 3.1 the properties and
the conditions for existence of the simplest model of entrepreneurial liquidity demand; this
derivation is done by abstracting from unemployment risk and private debt issuance, and by
considering one-period projects (that is, we set  =  = 1 and  = 0). We then characterise
in Section 3.2 the dynamics of scal shocks in this economy and carry out a number of
sensitivity checks, notably with respect to the scal policy rule and shocks, as well as the
length of project and the severity of the borrowing constraint. Finally, we study in Section
3.3 the case in which both liquidity-constrained workers and entrepreneurs interact (i.e.,
 2 (0; 1)), so that the two sources of idiosyncratic risk (unemployment risk and random
project opportunities) determine the economy-wide demand for liquidity.
3.1 Agentsbehaviour and equilibrium
The optimality conditions for entrepreneurs are given by equations (4)(6), with  it = 0 8t.
For entrepreneurs currently running a project (i.e., those for whom i = 1), equation (4) is
inoperative (since they do not supply labour), the optimal labour demand (6) applies, and
the optimality condition (5) holds with strict inequality (by conjecture C1). For those who
do not run projects (that is, for whom i = 0), equation (6) is inoperative (since they do
not demand labour), but equations (4)(5) both hold with equality (by conjecture C2). As
in Section 2, an equilibrium with a limited number of household type/asset states results
from conjectures C1-C2 and the assumed utility function (3). For the sake of conciseness,
we simply describe the properties of this equilibrium here and then establish the su¢ cient
conditions for its existence in Proposition 2 below (see also Appendix B1 for details).
With one period-lived projects (i.e.,  = 1), the model generates the following three
types of entrepreneurs: i) f entrepreneurswho currently run a project but were supplying
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labour in the previous period; ii) ee entrepreneurs, who do not currently run a project
and did not in the previous period either (i.e., they have been supplying labour in both
periods); and iii) fe entrepreneurs, who are currently employed after having run a project
in the previous period. By conjecture C2, entrepreneurs who do not run a project are not
borrowing-constrained, which under the utility function (3) implies that they all choose the
same consumption and asset holding levels, denoted by ~cet and ~a
e
t (note that ~c
e
t will be time-
varying, due to changes in the real wage). By conjecture C1, entrepreneurs who do run a
project are borrowing-constrained, and we denote by cft and l
f
t their consumption and labour
demands. The budget constraints of each type of entrepreneur are:
ee : ~cet + ~a
e
t = ~a
e
t 1Rt 1 + wt~l
ee
t   Tt; (34)
fe : ~cet + ~a
e
t = wtl
fe
t + l
f
t 1   Tt   ; (35)
f : cft + wtl
f
t = ~a
e
t 1Rt 1   Tt + =Rt: (36)
Equation (34) is the same as (21), except for the fact that the consumption of entre-
preneurs who do not run a project, ~cet ; is now time-varying (due to time-variations in the
equilibrium wage). In equation (35), fe entrepreneurs earn the labour income wtl
fe
t plus
production output yt = l
f
t 1; and this total income is used to pay for consumption, ~c
e
t , asset
accumulation, ~aet , taxes , Tt, and the repayment of their debt obligations, . Equation (36),
the budget constraint of entrepreneurs running a project, states that they entirely liquidate
their (beginning-of-period) assets, ~aet 1Rt 1, and borrow up to the borrowing limit =Rt, in
order to nance current consumption, cft , taxes, Tt, and the wage bill wtl
f
t .
Finally, we denote by ~!ee,   and ~!fe the asymptotic shares of entrepreneurs of type
ee, f , and fe, respectively, which are assumed to prevail from date 0 onwards (note that
by construction   is also the number of projects being run in the economy). Given the
transitions of entrepreneurs among individual states, these shares are given by:
~!ee = = (2  ) ;   = ~!fe = (1  ) = (2  ) : (37)
From (4)(5) and (34)(36), the intratemporal and intertemporal optimality conditions
for entrepreneurs not currently running a project but supplying labour to the market are:
wtu
0 (~cet ) = 1; (38)
u0 (~cet ) = RtEt(u
0  ~cet+1+ (1  )u0(cft+1)): (39)
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From (36), entrepreneurs who run a project allocate their after-tax resources, ~aet 1Rt 1 
Tt+ =Rt, to current consumption, c
f
t , and the wage bill, wtl
f
t , taking the real wage as given.
From (6) and (36), together with the fact that these entrepreneurs exit active entrepreneur-
ship after one period, the solution to their optimal labour demand, lft , satises:
wtu
0(cft ) = Etu
0 (~cet ) : (40)
The optimality condition (40) simply sets equal the utility fall implied by a decrease in
current consumption necessary to hire an extra unit of labour to the utility gain that is
expected from increasing current labour input (and thus future production) by that unit.
Given that entrepreneurs running a project are in proportion  ; clearing of the bond,
labour and goods markets now requires:
(1   ) ~aet    =Rt = Bt; (41)
(1  2 ) ~leet +  lfet =  lft ; (42)
(1   ) ~cet +  cft +Gt =  yt: (43)
Equation (41) is similar to (23). Equation (42) is like (24), except for the fact that total
labour demand, Lt =  l
f
t , now emanates from the entrepreneurial sector. In equation (43),
yt is output per entrepreneur and thus Yt =  yt is total output. Finally, the governments
behaviour is described by the budget constraint (8), together with our scal rule and shock
processes (9)(10), where again  must be large enough for public debt to be stationary.
Proposition 2, whose proof is found in Appendix B1, parallels Proposition 1 by stating the
conditions under which our limited-heterogeneity entrepreneurial equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. Assume that i)  (c)  1, ii) uctuations of Bt around B are small, and iii)
(B; ) jointly satisfy:
0 < B +  < ~ 

2
 + 1   +

1  

u0 1
 
 1

:
Then, the equilibrium with three types of entrepreneurs exists and has an interest rate Rt
strictly lower than 1= for all t.
Just as in the case of liquidity-constrained workers, the existence of a limited-heterogeneity
equilibrium with liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs relies on steady-state public debt being
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su¢ ciently low. Importantly, here again the requirement that  (c)  1 is meant to guar-
antee steady-state uniqueness for all possible parameter congurations, but one can easily
construct economies where  > 1 and verify numerically that uniqueness still prevails.
Entrepreneurs who encounter a project opportunity play a central role in our analysis,
so it may be instructive to decompose their budget set in equilibrium as we did earlier for
workers falling into unemployment (see (29)). Substituting (41) into (36), we obtain:
cft|{z}
consumption
+ wtl
f
t|{z}
wage bill
=
Bt 1Rt 1
1    +
 
1   | {z }
liquidated portfolio
+

Rt|{z}
borrowing
  Tt|{z}
taxes
:
In short, these entrepreneurs allocate their after-tax resources between current consump-
tion and the wage bill, with the optimal trade-o¤ between the two characterised by equation
(40). These resources consist of their liquidated asset portfolio, whose value depends on the
stocks of outside and inside liquidity available in the economy (and hence on Bt 1 and ),
as well as the corporate debt they are able to issue (up to =Rt), minus taxes.
3.2 The dynamic e¤ects of scal shocks
The dynamic system characterising the entrepreneurial model involves more lags and more
interactions between variables than the basic model (the equations forming this dynamic
system are described in Appendix B1). For the sake of comparability, we run policy ex-
periments with exactly the same parameter values as in the previous section, except for ,
which is now set to 0.80 (implying a share of entrepreneurs of   ' 16:67%).15 As is sum-
marised in Appendix B2, the dynamics of the entrepreneurial model yield an expectational
dynamic system that can be solved numerically for the vector of relevant variables and for
the stationarity condition.
Figure 4 displays the responses of scal and aggregate variables to either type of scal
shock generated by our baseline entrepreneurial model. (Note that ~cet and l
f
t , although not
represented, are tracked by wt and Yt+1, respectively). Let us start with government spending
shocks again. Since liquidity e¤ects on labour demand take one period to be operative (as
15This value is roughly equal to the number of U.S. rms, from The Census Bureaus 2002 Survey of
Business Owners (23 million rms) divided by total employment by the end of the same year from the BLS
Current Population Survey (136.5 million people).
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 4. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs: baseline case. The panels dis-
play the linear deviations from the steady state of taxes (Tt), public debt (Bt), private consumption
(Ct), output (Yt) and the real wage (wt) following a government spending shock (Panel A) or a
tax cut shock (Panel B) of 5% of steady-state output. Three values of the policy responsiveness
parameter are considered (the benchmark is  = 0:2).
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some employed households having increased their savings turn into entrepreneurs), wealth
e¤ects on labour supply dominate on impact for all values of . The ensuing increase in labour
supply leads to a sharp fall in the real wage and the consumption of employed households,
causing total private consumption to fall. However, when  = 0:2 liquidity e¤ects on labour
demand become dominant (in the sense of leading to higher-than-steady-state wages) for
the entire adjustment path starting from one period after the shock, leading to a persistent
boom in private consumption. While these positive wage and private consumption responses
are magnied when  = 0:15, they are inverted when  = 1:2. In this latter case, the strong
reaction of taxes and limited growth of public both act to weaken the liquidity e¤ects on
labour demand whilst strengthening wealth e¤ects on labour supply. This leads to a limited
increase in labour demand relative to the contemporaneous increase in labour supply, and
thus to a fall in the real wage and a crowding-out of private consumption by public spending.
Here again, values of  between 0.2 and 1.2 (not represented here) generate a more mixed
picture with dominance of either e¤ect at di¤erent points on the transition path.
The response of private consumption to tax cut shocks looks qualitatively similar to that
generated by the model with liquidity-constrained households, but labour market adjust-
ments play a central role here. More specically, a tax cut loosens the borrowing constraint
of entrepreneurs (equation (36)) both directly through its e¤ect on Tt and indirectly through
it e¤ect on at 1Rt 1. This in turn contributes to raise both entrepreneursconsumption,
cft , and their labour demand, l
f
t . This higher labour demand then raises the equilibrium
real wage and hence the consumption of employed households, ~cet (see (38)). Unsurprisingly,
these e¤ects are larger the smaller is the policy responsiveness parameter.
Sensitivity. Figure 5 shows how modifying either risk aversion or shock persistence alters
impulse-response functions. As in the model with liquidity-constrained consumers, a higher
degree of risk aversion tends to magnify liquidity e¤ects (see Panel A), since it triggers a
larger reaction of the equilibrium real interest rate and thus of the stock of public debt. Note,
however, that with  = 0:5 and after a spending shock liquidity e¤ects on labour demand
are so weak that they are dominated by wealth e¤ects on labour supply over much of the
adjustment path; consequently, both the real wage and private consumption lie below their
steady-state value most of the time (rst row of Panel A). The conict between wealth and
liquidity e¤ects is
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A. Alternative degrees of risk aversion
B. Alternative shock persistence
Figure 5. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs: sensitivity. The gure displays
the responses of private consumption (Ct), output (Yt) and the real wage (wt) to spending and tax
cut shocks. The baseline calibration (bold curves) is  = 1 and  =  = 0:95.
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even more apparent when one looks at the e¤ect of changing the persistence of spending
shocks (rst row of Panel B). On the one hand, such shocks imply that taxes are higher than
their steady-state value for a sustained amount of time, which leads to a prolonged increase
in labour supply. On the other hand, these shocks raise public debt and hence the labour
demand of entrepreneurs. Since raising the persistence of the shock strengthens both e¤ects,
the way it will a¤ect the equilibrium real wage and private consumption at di¤erent point
of the adjustment path is a priori ambiguous. In the case of tax cut shocks (second row of
Panel B), lower taxes and higher liquidity both contribute to generate a short-run boom in
the real wage and private consumption.
Figure 6 compares our baseline entrepreneurial model (in which  = 0) with one with
both inside and outside liquidity (i.e.,  > 0), and impose for the latter the unique value of B
that generates a B=Y ratio of 8/3 (since R, and thus Y , are interpreted as quarterly values,
the corresponding yearly debt-output ratio would be 2/3); given our requirement that the
steady-state gross interest rate be 1:01, this uniquely pins down . Again, a higher share
of private debt turns out to weaken the responses of all variables, due to the interest rate
increase that follows scal shocks. More specically, in the economy with inside liquidity,
this higher rate reduces entrepreneursability to borrow (since =Rt is smaller), and hence
their consumption and labour demand move less than in the baseline economy; this in turn
translates into a smaller reaction of the real wage and thus a muted increase in entrepreneurs
consumption. The impact of this crowding out on total output naturally follows. Of course,
we should expect a similar crowding out of private demand to take place if we were to
introduce other assets into the economy, such as claims on the capital stock. In the latter
case, the higher interest rate induced by scal expansions would deter investment demand
and thus tune down the economys reaction to scal shocks (see Aiyagari and McGrattan,
1998, for an analysis of this crowding out in the steady state). Here again, which channel
is likely to dominate ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the crowding-in and
crowding-out e¤ects on private demand.
In Figure 7, we consider the case in which entrepreneurial projects last for more than
one period (see Appendix B3 for details). To understand how this modies the responses to
scal shocks, take the simple example where  = 2. Entrepreneurs running a project in the
current period now include two types of entrepreneurs: those who start a project
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 6. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs: with and without inside
liquidity. The panels are as in Figure 4, with the impulse-response functions now showing the
responses of the variables in the economy with and without inside liquidity.
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in the current period and those whose project started in the previous period and are still
ongoing. Importantly, both are borrowing-constrained provided that wtRt < 1 (see our
discussion of condition (7) above). Extending the project length has two conicting e¤ects
here. One the one hand, debt-nanced scal shocks increase the stock of liquidity in the
economy. This increased liquidity relaxes the borrowing constraint of entrepreneurs who
encounter a project opportunity and boosts their labour demand. Hence, they will produce
more output in the next period, which will again enable them to raise their labour demand
in the next period too and to produce more output two periods ahead. Thus, long-lived
projects generate intertemporal spillovers of scal-policy shocks. On the other hand, if we
maintain, as we do, the share of active entrepreneurs at the same value as in the baseline
model (about 17%), the probability of meeting an investment opportunities, 1  , must be
smaller (0.1 instead of 0.2); this tends to reduce the immediate impact of liquidity shocks. As
shown in Figure 7 this latter e¤ect slightly dominates the former under our parameterisation.
Note, however, that this dominance is small, in the sense that the overall impact of scal
shocks is primarily dominated by the scal rule rather than by the length of projects (at
least for the lengths that we are considering). For example, if we set ' = 0:1 a value that
still generates a plausible debt response to the shocks, then liquidity e¤ects remain largely
dominant even with  = 4: We may thus conclude that our basic qualitative results about
the expansionary e¤ects of scal shocks are robust to the inclusion of long projects.
3.3 The economy with constrained workers and entrepreneurs
Having disentangled how the liquidity e¤ects induced by rising public debt a¤ect liquidity-
constrained workers (who self-insure against unemployment risk) and liquidity-constrained
entrepreneurs (who hoard wealth to nance stochastic project opportunities), it is now
straightforward to consider the more general and realistic case in which households of both
occupations interact, i.e.,  2 (0; 1).
The budget constraints and optimality conditions for entrepreneurs are given by (34)
(40), as before. Regarding workers, their budget constraints are still given by equations (14)
and (19)(21), but their optimality conditions must be modied slightly to account for the
fact that they face a potentially time-varying wage payment in the labour market.
The rst thing to note is that the optimal consumption level of employed workers is no
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 7. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs: impact of long projects.
The panels are as in Figure 4, with the IRFs now showing the variables responses for di¤erent
values of the project length ( ) and the scal policy responsiveness parameter ().
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longer given by equation (16), but by (38) instead, and is thus equal to that of entrepreneurs
not currently running an investment project. This in turn implies that their optimal asset
demand is now given by:
u0 (~cet ) = 
eRtEtu
0 (~cet ) +  (1  e)RtEtu0(aetRt   Tt+1): (44)
The market-clearing conditions must be modied to account for the interactions of all
types of agents in the economy. For example, equilibrium in the bonds market now requires:
(1  ) (!ee + !ue) aet + 
 
~!ee + ~!fe

~aet = Bt; (45)
where the !s are those in (22) and (37) above.
The rst part in the right-hand side of (45) is the total asset demand emanating from em-
ployed workers, which is in turn given by their total mass in the population (1  ) (!ee + !ue)
times their (common) individual asset demand aet , with the latter given by (44). The sec-
ond part of the equation is the total liquidity demand by entrepreneurs contemplating the
possibility of having an investment opportunity in the next period; those are in numbers
 (~!ee + ~!ue) in the population, while each of them hoards a quantity ~aet of liquidity (with
~aet being determined by (39)). With  = 0, the right-hand side of the inequality, Bt, is the
aggregate supply of liquidity in the economy (as before, setting  > 0 would lower the impact
of scal shocks but would not alter our results qualitatively).
Similarly, the equilibrium condition in the market for goods is now given by:
(1  ) (!ee + !ue) +   ~!ee + ~!fe ~cet
+ (1  )!ueceut + (1  )!uucuut +  cft +Gt =  lft 1: (46)
Take the right-hand side of (46), and recall that ~cet is now the consumption level of both
employed workers and entrepreneurs waiting for a project opportunity; again, the former and
the latter are in numbers (1  ) (!ee + !ue) and   ~!ee + ~!fe in the population, respec-
tively. The other relevant consumption levels (i.e., ceut , c
uu
t and c
f
t ) are similarly weighted by
their respective population shares. As in our baseline economy, total output is produced by
those who encountered a project opportunity in the last period (because of the production
lag); those demanded a quantity of labour lft 1, and are now in number   in the population.
Finally, equilibrium in the labour market requires:
(1  ) (!eeleet + !ueluet ) + (~!ee~leet + ~!felfet ) =  lft : (47)
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Figure 8 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of scal shocks for several values of the share
of entrepreneurs in the economy. Our calibration strategy here is as follows: given the
coexistence of workers and entrepreneurs, we adjust the probabilities of changing status,
1  e and 1  ; in such a way that the unemployment and active entrepreneurship rates in
the population, here (1  ) 
 and  , assume the same values as in the basic scenarios of
Sections 2 and 3, namely 5.88% and 16.67% (the transition probability u is left at 0.20, but
adjusting it within realistic bounds jointly with e only changes the IRFs marginally). Then,
the requirements that e;  > 0 impose bounds on , given our chosen values of (1  ) 

and  ; here it implies that we must have 0:33 <  < 0:89.
The fact that we cannot continously move from  = 1, in which case the value of e
is irrelevant, to a value of  consistent with e > 0 implies that the dynamic e¤ects of
scal shocks evolve substantially across the two specications. In particular, the economy
with both workers and entrepreneurs displays a stronger and more persistent reaction of
public debt to both kinds of scal policy shocks, and hence stronger liquidity e¤ects on
all aggregates (this arises because the interest rate interest rate response to the shock is
substantially stronger when 0:33 <  < 0:89 than when  = 1, and hence by equation (8)
public debt rises more and more persistently in the former case than in the latter. In this
context, values of  below  = 0:25 generate either a highly (and unrealistically) persistent
public debt response to the shocks, or even lack of stationarity; we thus impose  = 0:25 here.
Aside from this required scal-rule adjustment, the economy with both types of households
inherits the salient qualitative features of the two basic specications (i.e.,  = 0 and  = 1).
In particular, private consumption and the real wage start falling below steady state before
rising above it in a hump-shaped manner after a spending shock (this is because wealth
e¤ects are set in motion before liquidity e¤ects here), while tax cuts are expansionary all
along the transition path.
4 Concluding remarks
We have presented in this paper the predictions of a tractable liquidity-constrained economy
regarding the e¤ects of debt-nanced scal expansions, with particular attention being paid
to the e¤ects of spending shocks on private consumption and the real wage. Our main goal
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A. Government spending shock
B. Tax cut shock
Figure 8. The liquidity-constrained economy with workers and entrepre-
neurs. The panels are as in Figure 4, with  = 0:25 and for di¤erent values of the proportion of
entrepreneurs (either running a project or supplying labour) in the economy ().
44
has been to illustrate that the liquidity e¤ects induced by temporary changes in the stock
of public debt can drastically alter the predictions of the baseline complete-markets model,
in which changes in public spending a¤ect aggregates only through intertemporal wealth
e¤ects. To summarise, our main results are as follows:
First, debt-nanced increases in public spending generate potentially powerful liquidity
e¤ects when agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty. This e¤ect occurs because
aggregate liquidity facilitates self-insurance by households facing unemployment risk, while
at the same time helping potential entrepreneurs to hoard asset wealth for future invest-
ment needs. As a result, such policies may have strong expansionary e¤ects on private
consumption, labour demand, and the equilibrium real wage (in addition to raising labour
supply).
Second, both spending shocks and tax cuts have stronger e¤ects on macroeconomic ag-
gregates when the response of taxes necessary to ensure the solvency of the government is
delayed. This property arises because the extent of liquidity e¤ects is indexed by the aggre-
gate supply of assets in the economy, which is directly a¤ected by the dynamics of public
debt and hence by the tax rule adopted by the government.
Third, scal expansions are more e¤ective the tighter the borrowing constraints faced by
private agents. Tight borrowing constraints make agents highly dependent on government-
issued assets to self-insure against idiosyncratic income risk. In contrast, looser constraints
reduce their dependance, while at the same time crowding out private asset issuances when
borrowing limits are interest-rate dependent. While our analytical and qualitative (i.e.,
impulse response-based) results were derived in the context of simple examples of liquidity-
constrained economies, they appear robust across a fairly broad range of specications.
Our model relied on two assumptions that we are planning to dispose of in future research.
First, we abstracted from capital accumulation. As discussed above, when public debt and
capital are substitutes as outside liquidity instruments then debt-nanced scal shocks are
bound to crowd out private investment demand and thus to reduce the impact of scal shocks;
further investigation is thus needed to assess the extent of this crowding out and how it would
a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of scal policy. Second, we have assumed throughout that there was
no distortionary cost associated with high levels of government debt, so that raising liquidity
supply could only be benecial in the liquidity-constrained equilibrium; again, incorporating
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such distortions is likely to qualify (but also enrich) our results on the dynamic e¤ects of
scal shocks. More generally, the relative tractability of our model may make it useful for
understanding more complicated scal-policy issues such as the international transmission of
scal shocks. In particular, it has been argued that scarce world liquidity and heterogenous
nancial development are crucial in determining the direction and size of international capital
ows (e.g., Caballero et al., 2008). Inasmuch as domestic public debt provides liquidity to
foreign savers, our framework may o¤er new insights into how scal shocks are transmitted
across nancially integrated economies.
Appendix A. Liquidity-constrained workers
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
If uctuations around the steady state are su¢ ciently small, then C1 and C2 hold in every
period provided that they hold in the steady state. The condition B +  > 0 implies that
either B > 0 or  > 0 or both, and hence that ae > 0 from equation (23); thus, conjecture
C2 holds provided that B+  > 0. What is left to establish is that conjecture C1 holds in
the steady state provided that conditions i-iv in the proposition are satised. We proceed in
two steps. First we show that R < 1 if and only if B +  <  (step 1). Second, we show
that C1 holds whenever R < 1 and conditions i-iii are satised (step 2).
Step 1. To prove that R < 1 if and only if B <  , we show that B (R) is a continuous,
strictly increasing function of R over the appropriate interval and that B (1=) =   (so
that B (R) <    , R < 1=). First, let us rewrite the steady-state counterpart of (17)
as follows:
u0 (ceu) = ((R) 1   e)= (1  e) ; (A1)
By assumption G = 0, implying that T = B(R  1). Thus, after some manipulations the
steady-state counterpart of (26) can be written as:
B = ~B (R)  =R  B (R) ; (A2)
where
B (R) 

1  

1 + 
 (R  1)

u0 1
 
(R) 1   e
1  e
!
:
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The term  =R in (A2) is strictly increasing in R when  > 0. Moreover, we have:
B0 (R) =
  (1  
) 

[1 + 
 (R  1)]2u
0 1
 
(R) 1   e
1  e
!
+

1  

1 + 
 (R  1)

@
@R
u0 1
 
(R) 1   e
1  e
!
:
(A3)
Equation (A1) implies that u0(ceu (R)) = ((R) 1   e)= (1  e) ; so the @u0 1 (:) =@R
term above is:
@
@R
u0 1
 
(R) 1   e
1  e
!
=
1
u00 (ceu)
 @u
0 (ceu)
@R
=
1
u00 (ceu)
  1
(1  e) R2 :
After rearranging, this allows us to rewrite (A3) as follows:
B0 (R) =
  (1  
) 
ceu
[1 + 
 (R  1)]2 +

1  

1 + 
 (R  1)

  R
 2
(1  e)  
1
u00 (ceu)
=
(1  
) 
u0 (ceu)
[1 + 
 (R  1)]2 u00 (cu)

 c
euu00 (ceu)
u0 (ceu)
  (1 + 
 (R  1))

R2 (1  e) u0 (ceu)

=
(1  
) 
u0 (ceu)
[1 + 
 (R  1)]2 u00 (ceu)

 (ceu)  1 + 
 (R  1)
(1  eR) 
R

:
The term inside the pair of large brackets must be negative for B0 (R) to be positive. Since
 (c)  1 by assumption, a su¢ cient condition for this is (1 + 
 (R  1)) = (1  eR) 
R >
1, which is always true. Thus, B (R) is continuous and strictly increasing in over (0; 1=e)
and, from the denition of B (R) ; we have the boundaries:
lim
R!0
B (R) = u0 1 (1) (= 0); lim
R!1=e
B (R) =
e (1  
)u0 1 (0)
1 + 
 (1  e) ( 1) :
This in turn implies that B(R) in (A2) is continuous and strictly increasing in R.
When  = 0, we have that B(R) = B (R), and the inequality B(R) <  is recovered by
evaluating B (R) at R = 1=. When  > 0, the maximum possible value of R is still 1=e,
with limR!1=e B (R) = limR!1=e B (R). The lowest possible value of R, denoted Rmin,
corresponds to the point at which B(Rmin) = 0. Hence, from (A2), Rmin is the (unique)
solution to B (R) = =R, and by construction we have that limR!Rmin B (R) = 0. Again, the
equivalence between R < 1 and B +  <  follows from the increasingness of the B (R)
function and its evaluation at R = 1=. (Note also that Rmin < 1= since B (1=) > 
under condition iv in the proposition).
Step 2. We must now show that R < 1 is a su¢ cient condition for conjecture C1 to hold
when conditions i-iii in the proposition also hold. For C1 to hold, both eu and uu workers
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must be borrowing-constrained in the steady state, so that we must have:
u0 (ceu) > R (1  u)u0 (ce) + Ruu0 (cuu) ; (A4)
u0 (cuu) > R (1  u)u0 (ce) + Ruu0 (cuu) ; (A5)
with u0 (ce) = 1 (see equation (16)). The right-hand side of (A4) and (A5) are the expected
marginal utility of future consumption for an unemployed worker, which in our conjectured
equilibrium is the same whether the worker is eu or uu. Hence, there are two cases to consider.
If cuu  ceu, then u0 (cuu)  u0 (ceu) and (A5) is a su¢ cient for (A4)(A5) to hold; on the
contrary, if ceu > cuu, then u0 (ceu) < u0 (ceu) and (A4) is a su¢ cient condition for (A4)(A5)
to hold. Case 1. Assume that cuu  ceu, so that (A5) is the relevant su¢ cient condition.
The inequality holds for u ! 1 whenever R < 1. Then, since u0 (cuu) > u0 (ce) (because
cuu < ce, otherwise the employed would be constrained), it follows that the inequality holds
for all u 2 [0; 1). Case 2. Assume that ceu > cuu, so that (A4) is the relevant su¢ cient
condition. Using (A1), we may rewrite (A4) as follows:
1  eR  (1  e) 2R2
(1  e) 2R2 > 
u (u0 (cuu)  u0 (ce)) :
The fact that R < 1 ensures that the left hand side of this inequality is positive, while
cuu < ce implies the right hand side also is. Thus, the inequality holds provided that u is
su¢ ciently small (condition ii in Proposition 1).
Maximum public debt-output ratio. Note that the condition according to which B <   
can be expressed equivalently as a condition on the maximum level of the steady-state public
debt-output ratio, B=Y , consistent with the liquidity-constrained equilibrium. Using (28),
(22), the fact that T = B (R  1) and the denitions of 	 and  in Section 2.3, we nd that
the output-public debt ratio can be expressed as follows:
Y
B
= 
 +
1
B

	 +


R

+ R:
Recall that R increases with B, so the second term in the right-hand side of the latter
equation falls with B while the third term rises with B. However, as u becomes small (con-
dition ii) in the proposition), R becomes small relative to (	 + 
=R)B 1, thus the second
term determines how B a¤ects Y=B. This implies that the public debt-output ratio B=Y
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rises with B, so that we can nd the maximum value of B=Y consistent with our limited-
heterogeneity equilibrium by evaluating B=Y at R = 1=. After some rearrangements, we
obtain: 
B
Y

R=1=
=


 + 	
   +


 1
:
A2. Dynamics and stability
We use hatted variables to denote level-deviations from steady state (i.e., X^t = Xt   X).
First, substitute (9)(10) into the linearised versions of (8) and (26) to obtain:
B^t =

B
1 + 

R^t 1 +

R
1 + 

B^t 1 +

1
1 + 

Gt +

1
1 + 

T ct ; (A6)
R^t =
 R2 (1  e)u00 (ceu)
1  

h
(1 + 
)Et(B^t+1)   Gt   
T ct
i
  (1  e) u00 (ceu) Et(R^t+1); (A7)
where, from (A1)(A2),
ceu = u0 1
 
(R) 1   e)
1  e
!
=
(B + =R) (1 + 
 (R  1))
1  
 :
Equations (A6)(A7) dene a two-dimensional backward/forward dynamic system, with
sequences of unknowns fB^tg1t=0 and fR^tg1t=0 and forcing sequences fGtg1t=0 and fT ct g1t=0.
The solution to this system takes the form of a VAR whose coe¢ cients can be recovered
by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. More specically, let Xt  [ B^t R^t ]0 and
Zt  [ Gt T ct ]0. Leading (A6) one period, taking expectations and substituting (10) and
(A7) into the resulting equation, we can express the dynamics of the model in matrix form
as Xt = MEt (Xt+1) + NZt, where M and N are conformable matrices whose coe¢ cients
are functions of the deep parameters of the model. There are now two cases to consider,
depending on whether  = 0 or  > 0.
Case 1. When  = 0, M is singular, implying that the solution dynamics of the model
is univariate. To see why this is the case, let us rewrite (A7) as follows, making use of
(A1)(A2) and the denition of  in (33):
(=B)Et

(1 + 
) B^t+1    Gt   
T ct

= R^t: (A8)
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Leading (A3) one period and taking expectations, solving (A5) for Et(B^t+1), and then
equating the two expressions, we obtain:
RB^t +  

1  (1 + )
1 + 


Gt + 

1  (1 + ) 

(1 + 
)

T ct = B

(1 + )
 (1 + 
)
  1

R^t:
Now, lagging the latter equation one period, solving it for R^t 1and substituting the
resulting expression into (A3), one nds equation (32) with coe¢ cients:
 =
R
1 +    (1 + 
) ;  =
1
1 + 
;  =    (1  
)
R (1 + )
;  =
 (1  
)
R (1 + )
;
where R is uniquely dened by B (see Appendix A1).
The sign of  is related to the stationarity requirement that jj < 1: In the case where
 > 0, then a necessary and su¢ cient condition for stationarity is (33) in the body of the
paper, given that 1   
 > 0. Does a stationary path for Bt exist consistent with the case
where  < 0? If  < 0, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for stationarity becomes
 < ( 1 R + ) = (1  
) ; but the right-hand side of this inequality is negative. Since
this is inconsistent with  > 0, it must be the case that (33) holds, which in turn implies
that  > 0. By implication  < 0, and obviously  > 0 and  > 0 since  > 0. Finally, with
 > 0 and 1  
 > 0 we have @=@ < 0.
Case 2. When  > 0, M is invertible and the solution dynamics are bivariate. First, rewrite
the forward-looking dynamics Xt = MEt (Xt+1) +NZt as follows:
Et (Xt+1) = M
 1Xt  M 1NZt: (A9)
We know from the literature on expectational linear systems (e.g., Uhlig, 2001) that the
solution to (A9) has the following VAR representation:
Xt = ~MXt 1 + ~NZt; (A10)
where ~M and ~N are matrices to be determined. Leading (A10) one period, taking expecta-
tions and using (A9) enables us to fully identify ~M and ~N . We may then verify numerically
that for the parameter congurations considered when running impulse-response functions
 is su¢ ciently large for fXtg1t=0 to remain stationary.
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A3. Imperfectly elastic labour supply
For simplicity we assume here that  = 0, but nothing peculiar hinges on this assumption.
With imperfectly inelastic labour supply, asset accumulation is gradual, and not all working
agents end the period with the same asset wealth. We denote by auet and a
ee
t the end-of-period
asset wealth of ue and ee workers, respectively, and by cuet and that c
ee
t the corresponding
individual consumption levels. By assumption, all ee workers pool their asset wealth at the
beginning of the period, so any ee worker turns out starting the period with individual asset 
!eeaeet 1 + !
ueauet 1

= (!ee + !ue) there are e!ee and e!ue workers entering date t with
wealth aeet 1 and a
ue
t 1, respectively, and the total number of ee workers is !
ee = e (!ee + !ue).
Since !ee= (!ee + !ue) = e and !ue= (!ee + !ue) = 1   e, we may rewrite the budget
constraint of an ee worker as follows:
ee : ceet + a
ee
t =
 
eaeet 1 + (1  e) auet 1

Rt 1 + leet   Tt: (A11)
Since eu workers hold end-of-period wealth level auet , their budget constraint is:
ue : cuet + a
ue
t = l
ue
t   Tt: (A12)
Note that workers who fall into unemployment at date t can now be of two di¤erent
types, depending on their asset holdings at the end of date t   1 with (i.e., aeet 1 or auet 1),
which in turn depends on their labour statuses at dates t   1 and t   2. These two types
(that is, eeu workersand ueu workers) have the following budget constraints:
eeu : ceeut = a
ee
t 1Rt 1   Tt; ueu : cueut = auet 1Rt 1   Tt:
Finally, the budget constraint of uu workers is unchanged (i.e., uu : cuut =   Tt).
The optimal asset demand and labour supply decisions of employed workers are as follows:
ee workers, who end the current period with wealth aeet , remain employed with 
e, in which
case they remain of the ee type, or fall into unemployment, in which case they become of
the eeu type. Similarly, ue workers stay employed and become ee or fall into unemployment
and become ueu. Hence the optimal asset demand and labour supply decisions of ee and ue
workers must satisfy:
ee : u0 (ceet ) = 
eRtu
0  ceet+1+  (1  e)RtEtu0(ceeut+1); u0 (ceet ) = v0 (leet ) ;
ue : u0 (cuet ) = 
eRtu
0  ceet+1+  (1  e)RtEtu0(cueut+1); u0 (cuet ) = v0 (luet ) :
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Finally, the bond market clearing condition must be modied to account for the fact that
aeet 6= auet whenever v0 (l) 6= 1. It is now given by !eeaeet + !ueauet = Bt:
Note that when labour supply becomes perfectly elastic (i.e., v0 (l) = 1 8l, as in our
baseline utility function), the intratemporal optimality conditions for ee and ue workers give
u0 (ceet ) = u
0 (cuet ) = 1, so that c
ee
t = c
ue
t = u
0 1 (1) = ce. Then, their intertemporal optimality
conditions, combined with the budget constraints of eeu and ueu workers, give
1 = Rt +  (1  )RtEtu0(aset Rt   Tt+1); s = u; e;
so that aeet = a
ue
t = a
e
t and c
eeu
t = c
ueu
t = c
eu
t . Hence the economy with partial risk sharing
nests our baseline model as a special case.
Appendix B. Liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs
B1. Proof of Proposition 2
Wemust rst derive the dynamic system characterising the entrepreneurial equilibrium under
the joint conjecture that entrepreneurs are always borrowing-constrained while employed
households never are, and then derive from the steady-state relations the range of debt
levels compatible with this joint conjecture. Equations (38) and (40) give:
~cet = u
0 1  w 1t  ; cft = u0 1  w 1t Et  w 1t+1 (B1)
Substituting (B1) into (43), the goods-market equilibrium can be written as:
u0 1
 
w 1t

+ (1  )u0 1  w 1t Et  w 1t+1+ (2  )Gt = (1  ) lft 1 (B2)
Substituting (8), (41) and (B1) into the budget constraint of f -households, (36), gives:
u0 1
 
w 1t Et
 
w 1t+1

+ wtl
f
t = (2  ) (Bt  Gt +  Tt) +
 (1 + (1  )Rt)
Rt
: (B3)
Finally, substituting (B1) into (39), the Euler equations for employed households is:
w 1t = Rt
 
Et
 
w 1t+1

+ (1  )Et
 
w 1t+1Et+1
 
w 1t+2

(B4)
Since shocks are small by assumption, the dynamic system just derived is an equilibrium
if, in the steady state, i) all employed households hold positive assets at the end of the
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current period (which, from (23), is ensured by B > 0), and ii) entrepreneurs are always
borrowing-constrained, i.e., u0(cf ) > Ru0 (~ce). From (B1), this latter condition is equivalent
to wR < 1. Now, the steady state counterpart of (B4) gives:
w = 2 (1  )R= (1  R) ; (B5)
so that @w=@R > 0. Substituting (B5) into the inequality wR < 1, we nd that entrepreneurs
are borrowing-constrained if and only if R < 1=.
We may now compute B; the unique upper debt level ensuring that R 2 (0; 1=)
whenever B 2 (0; B). First, use the facts that G = 0 and T = B (R  1) to write the
steady-state counterparts of (B2) and (B3) as follows:
wlf =
wu0 1
 
w 1t

1   + wu
0 1  w 2 ;
wlf =

B +

R

(1 + (1  )R)  u0 1  w 2 :
Equating the two, using (B5) and rearranging, we can write steady-state public debt as:
~B (R) =

R
1=R + 1  

2 (1  )
1  R
2
u0 1 (w 1)
(1  )w +
u0 1 (w 2)
w
+
u0 1 (w 2)
w2

  
R
;
(B6)
where w is itself a function of R (see (B5)). The term =R in (B6) is continuously increasing
in R over (0;1). The terms inside the rst two pairs of large brackets in (B6), as well as w in
(B5), are all continuously increasing in R over [0; 1=). Hence, if the term inside the third
pair of large brackets is non-decreasing in w, then ~B (R) will be continuous and increasing
in R over (0; 1=); we now show that this is the case provided that  (c)  1 for all c. By
making use of (B1), we can compute the following derivatives:
@
@w

u0 1 (w 1)
w

=
~ce
w2

1
 (~ce)
  1

;
@
@w

u0 1 (w 2)
w

=
cf
w2

2
 (cf )
  1

;
and
@
@w

u0 1 (w 2)
w2

=
2cf
w3

1
 (cf )
  1

:
All three are non negative if  (c)  1, implying that ~B (R) is continuously increasing
over (0; 1=). With   0, the lower bound for R consistent with ~B > 0 is ~Rmin that
solves ~B (R) = 0, and by construction we have that limR! ~Rmin
~B (R) = 0 and ~Rmin < 1=.
Moreover, equation (B6) implies that limR!1= ~B (R) = 1. Thus, we may compute the
joint condition on (B; ) stated in Proposition 2 by evaluating ~B (R) at R = 1=.
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As in the model with liquidity-constrained households, one may also compute the equiv-
alent maximum steady-state public debt-output ratio consistent with the bindingness of the
borrowing constraint by evaluating steady-state output Y at R = 1=. At R = 1=; we have
w =  (see (B5)) and hence ~ce = cf = u0 1 ( 1) (see (B1)). In this situation, the market
clearing condition (43) gives Y = u0 1 ( 1) and an upper value for the ratio of:
B
Y

R=1=
=
2
 + 1   +

1   :
B2. Dynamics and stability
The dynamic system characterising the behaviour of the entrepreneurial model is derived as
follows. First, substitute the linear counterparts of (9) and (B1) and into the linearised ver-
sions of (8) and (B2)(B4). The latter equations then form a four-dimensional expectational
dynamic system with forcing terms Gt and T ct and vector of unknowns:
Xt =
h
Bt l
f
t Rt wt
i0
This system can be solved numerically for its auto-regressive representation using stan-
dard methods once values have been assigned to all deep parameters of the model and to the
target debt level B: (Here again the latter is chosen so as to generates a steady state value of
R of 1.01, but equation (B6) rather than (A2), is used.) Finally, total private consumption
is Ct = (1   ) ~cet +  cft , with ~cet and cft given by (B1), and aggregate output is Yt =  lft 1.
For our baseline parameters, the stationarity requirement is  > min ' 0:134
B3. Long projects
Let us here assume that  = 0 and that all parameters apart from the length of projects are
at their baseline value. For any value of  , there are ee entrepreneurs and fe entrepreneurs in
the economy, with budget constraints (34)(35) and optimal labour supply and asset demand
choices characterised by (38)(39). However, values of  higher than one imply that there
are several types of entrepreneurs running a project as many as the number of periods that
a project lasts. For the sake of conciseness we only show how to construct the equilibrium
when  = 2 here, but the approach can be applied straightforwardly to higher values of  .
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With two-period projects there are two types of active entrepreneurs, those who are
currently starting a project and those who did so in the previous period. Let us call the
former f entrepreneurs(by analogy with the  = 1 case) and the latter ff entrepreneurs.
Under C1-C2, their budget constraints are as follows:
f : ceft + wtl
f
t = ~a
e
t 1Rt 1   Tt; ff : cff + wtlfft = lft 1   Tt:
In short, these two equations indicate that entrepreneurs who meet a project opportunity
entirely liquidate their asset wealth to invest in it, and will be using the implied output to
re-invest in the project (and consume) in the next period; we may then check numerically
that when B is su¢ ciently small, then wtRt < 1, so that these entrepreneurs would like
to borrow rather hold positive assets at the end of every period (that is, the economy is
liquidity-constrained). There are now two optimal labour demand conditions (rather than
the unique condition (40) in the one-stage case), depending on the stage of the project:
wtu
0(cft ) = Etu
0(cfft+1); wtu
0(cfft ) = Etu
0  ~cet+1 :
Finally, given that entrepreneurs not running a project will meet a project opportunity
with probability  in the next period and, in this case, run their project for exactly two
periods, the (asymptotic) shares of each type of entrepreneur in the economy are:
~!ff = ~!f = ~!fe = (1  ) = (3  2) ; ~!ee = = (3  2) ;
while the total number of entrepreneurs running a project is ~!ef + ~!ff = 2 (1  ) = (3  2)
here. Total output at date t results from the labour inputs of the two types of active
entrepreneurs in the previous period, ~!f lft 1 + ~!
ff lfft 1. Hence, the model is closed once the
following market-clearing conditions are imposed in bonds and goods markets:
 
1  ~!f   ~!ff at = Bt;  1  ~!f   ~!ff ~cet + ~!fcft + ~!ffcfft +Gt = ~!f lft 1 + ~!ff lfft 1:
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